POLL RESULTS

• A broad cross-section of respondents supports U.S. military action against ISIS (86% support/14% oppose), including 57% who strongly support it.
• In fact, support for U.S. military action transcends ideological boundaries, with 91% support among self-described conservatives, and 78% support among self-described liberals.
• That said, it is important to note that while two-thirds of self-described conservatives (65%) consider ISIS to be the most significant threat to U.S. national security, just two in five self-described liberals say the same (39%), with a plurality (41%) citing global climate change as the most significant threat.
• By a margin of six-to-one, respondents who watched President Obama’s speech report that they are more likely to support U.S. military action against ISIS than they were prior to watching the speech (47% more likely/8% less likely).
• The President gets mixed marks overall, with respondents split on his handling of terrorism (48% approve/52% disapprove) and on the question of whether he has a strategy to deal with ISIS (46% has strategy/54% does not have strategy).
• Respondents are ideologically split on the question of Obama’s handling of terrorism, with 83% of self-described liberals approving of his performance, and 80% of self-described conservatives disapproving.  The President earns a thumbs-up from self-described moderates (57% approve/43% disapprove).
• Similarly, 76% of self-described liberals believe the President has a strategy to deal with ISIS, compared with just 20% of self-described conservatives.  Self-described moderates are split, with a narrow majority (53%) saying they believe the President does have a strategy.
• Among liberals, Obama’s natural base, there is a split on the question of whether the President has a strategy to deal with ISIS between those who watched the speech and those who did not.  Among self-described liberals who watched the speech, 85% believe Obama has a strategy to deal with ISIS, but just 63% of those who did not watch say the same.
• The survey finds a similar dynamic among self-described moderates, with 60% of those who watched the speech saying the President has a strategy, compared with just 44% among those who did not watch the speech.
• While self-described conservatives overwhelmingly believe that Obama does not have a strategy to deal with ISIS, there is a slight difference between those who watched the speech (23% believe President has a strategy) and those who did not watch the speech (16% believe President has a strategy).

The study finds that if mapmakers target risk-averse incumbents, they can encourage those incumbents to retire and potentially create a more competitive seat.

Previous research has focused either on partisan effects (Which party “won” the 1980s round of redistricting?) or on aggregate trends (Do more incumbents retire after redistricting?). Our study builds on the extant research by looking at specifically which members of Congress are more likely to retire when presented with unfavorable redistricting, and posits a causal mechanism behind this effect. By examining redistricting in the 1990s, 2000s, and the most recent round leading up to the 2010 election, test whether there are systematic differences in how incumbents react to the uncertainty created by redistricting.

Specifically, we look at “risk-taking” incumbents vs. those who are “risk-averse.” We identify this propensity for risk in two ways: members of Congress who originally ran for office by challenging an incumbent rather than running for an open seat, and those who originally ran for office in a district where voters are predominantly members of the opposing party ( > 57% votes for the opposing party’s presidential candidate). Members of Congress who originally ran for office under one of these two conditions have a greater tolerance for risk than those who ran when there was an open seat or a safe partisan district.

In the paper, currently being prepared for submission to a peer-reviewed journal, we look at a couple different facets of redistricting generated uncertainty.  As seen in Figure 1, the first is the redistricting “timeline”, or how early the plan is adopted before the election. If incumbents respond poorly to uncertainty, we’d expect to see more retirements when plans are adopted late in the cycle. We find that risk-takers are unaffected by when the plan is adopted, while their risk-averse counterparts are more likely to retire when the plan is adopted late in the cycle.

We also compare the type of redistricting plan – was this plan a friendly one (“in-party”), a hostile one (“out-party”), or an incumbent protection plan (“bi-partisan”)? And how do risk-takers differ from those who are risk-averse in reacting to partisan plans? Figure 2 presents the difference between the two favorable types of redistricting and out-party redistricting. The values are calculated by subtracting the probability of retirement in bipartisan/in-party plans and out-party plans. As we can see, the likelihood of retirement between the different types of plans is statistically indistinguishable for risk-takers, but non-risk-takers are significantly more likely to retire when they face a hostile redistricting plan (“out-party”) compared to either of the two more favorable types.

By looking beyond aggregate trends and looking at characteristics of individual members of Congress, we confirm that politicians do not react to redistricting and uncertainty in the same way. Those who have previously shown a propensity to take risks are less responsive to manipulations by partisan mapmakers, and are less affected by uncertainty than their risk-averse counterparts. These individual characteristics help give us a greater understanding of exactly how partisan mapmakers can affect the decision-making process of incumbent members of Congress, and give us greater insight into how redistricting affects choice in democracy.